Here are a few more intriguing thoughts from The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. This first one is a simple refutation of the idea of an omnipotent god,
The traditional problem for omnipotence is the paradox of the stone: Could God create a stone too heavy for him to lift? If so, there is something God could not do – he could not lift such a stone. If not, there is again something God could not do – he could not create such a stone. In either case, there is something God could not do. It follows that there are things no God could do; neither he nor any other being could be omnipotent. (p. 200)
This second one is a refutation of the idea of an omniscient god,
Knowing how raises clear impossibilities for any traditional and omniscient God. If God is a being without a body, he cannot know how to juggle, how to balance on the parallel bars, or how to compensate for a strained muscle in the right calf. If omniscience demands knowing everything that can be known, therefore, no disembodied being can be omniscient. This form of difficulty can also be developed without appeal to other attributes. One of the things that I know is how to find out things that I do not know; I know how to find out what I do not know about the planet Jupiter, for example. Were an omniscient being to have all propositional knowledge, there would be nothing it did not know in the propositional sense. There must then be a form of knowledge that I have but that any such being would lack: knowing how to find the propositional knowledge it lacks. Any being that possessed all propositional knowledge would for that very reason lack a form of knowledge how. Knowledge by acquaintance also raises clear impossibilities for any traditional and omniscient God. Among those feelings that nonomniscient beings know all too well are lust and envy, fear, frustration, and despair. If a God is without moral fault, he cannot know lust or envy, and thus cannot qualify as omniscient. If a God is without limitation, he cannot know fear, frustration, or despair. Here too the argument can be pressed without appeal to other attributes. One of the feelings I know all too well is the recognition of my own ignorance. An omniscient being would have no ignorance, and thus this is a feeling no omniscient being could know. There can then be no omniscient being.” (p. 205)
I’ve heard the omnipotent refutation before, but the omniscient refutation really struck me. I’m reminded of the often expressed sentiment of theists that, “God is suffering with me. God knows my pain.” If you are not a Mormon and do not believe in an embodied god, then god cannot know your physical pain. And if you are Mormon and are suffering over some sin, like masturbation, then god cannot know your pain unless god, too, has masturbated. In a sense, then, whenever you are suffering, god is NOT with you. How’s that for “bleak”?